Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps: Unanswered Defamation Questions by Diamond, John L.
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 10 | Number 1 Article 5
1-1-1987
Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps: Unanswered
Defamation Questions
John L. Diamond
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
John L. Diamond, Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps: Unanswered Defamation Questions, 10 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 125 (1987).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol10/iss1/5
Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps:
Unanswered Defamation Questions
by JOHN L. DIAMOND*
The Supreme Court's recent decision on defamation law,
Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps 1 is far more intriguing for
the questions it leaves open, than for its narrow holding. In
Hepps, the Court held that "the common-law presumptions
that defamatory speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff
seeks damages against a media defendant for speech of public
concern."2 Consequently, in such cases, the plaintiff bears the
burden of proving that the defamatory speech is false in order
to recover damages. A state cannot place the burden of proving
the truth of allegedly defamatory statements on the defendant.
What is now known about constitutional defamation law can
be summarized succinctly. Since the Supreme Court first inter-
posed constitutional restrictions on defamation actions in its
1964 decision, New York Times v. Sullivan,3 a public official,
and by subsequent decision, a public figure,4 have been re-
quired to establish "with convincing clarity" "actual malice,"
which the Court defined to be publication of a statement "with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not,"' 5 before recovering damages from a
media defendant. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,6 the Supreme
Court held that a private plaintiff must establish that a media
* B.A., Yale College; Dipl. Crim., Cambridge University; J.D., Columbia Law
School; Professor of Law and Associate Academic Dean, University of California, Has-
tings College of the Law.
1. 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986).
2. Id. at 1564.
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
4. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (public official must prove
with convincing clarity actual malice by a media defendant); Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (extending constitutional privilege to defamatory criticism
of public figures).
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968), the
Court defined "reckless disregard" as "sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion
that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his
publication."
6. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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defendant was "at fault" before recovering any damages in a
defamation claim. The Gertz Court also held that a private
plaintiff's recovery is limited to "actual damages" upon a show-
ing of "fault," but is constitutionally permitted to recover all
damages with a showing of "actual malice" as defined in The
New York Times case. "Actual damages" was defined in Gertz
as "proven losses," which includes both demonstrated pecuni-
ary and emotional injury, but would clearly preclude punitive
damages.7 Gertz in brief dictum also suggested that only false
facts and not opinions could be the basis of a defamation
action.'
In 1985, the Supreme Court decided Dun & Bradstreet v.
Greenmoss Builders,9 which held that the Gertz restriction
against a private plaintiff recovering more than "actual dam-
ages," i.e., "punitive damages," without a showing of "actual
malice" was not applicable when the defamation did not in-
volve an issue of "public concern." Prior to Greenmoss, lower
courts had been divided over whether the restrictions in Gertz
protected all defendants or only media defendants.1" Green-
moss appeared to resolve that issue by restricting Gertz to pub-
lic issues and rejecting a dichotomy endorsed by the Vermont
Supreme Court in Greenmoss based on whether the defendant
was media or non-media.1'
After Greenmoss, a private plaintiff suing either a media or
non-media defendant over a defamatory assertion of fact not
involving a public issue would appear to be free of any constitu-
tional limitations on recovery. Since Greenmoss, on its facts,
dealt with the "actual damages" limitations imposed by Gertz, a
future Supreme Court decision might still impose Gertz's re-
quirement of "fault" on defamation involving non-public issues.
The Supreme Court in Greenmoss, however, emphasized that
Gertz was not applicable to "non-public" defamation, wiping
7. Id.
8. Id. at 339-40.
9. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
10. Id. at 753 n.1; Compare Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 318 N.W.2d 141, cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 883 (1982)(Gertz inapplicable to private figure suits against nonmedia
defendants); Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1980) (same);
Rowe v. Metz, 195 Colo. 424, 579 P.2d 83 (1978) (same); and Harley-Davidson Motor-
sports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Ore. 361, 568 P.2d 1359 (1977) (same), with Antwerp Dia-
mond Exchange, Inc. v. Better Business Bureau, 130 Ariz. 523, 637 P.2d 733 (1981)
(Gertz applicable in such situations); and Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350
A.2d 688 (1976) (same).
11. 472 U.S. at 753.
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the constitutional slate clean rather than simply modifying
Gertz. After Greenmoss, a major unanswered question in
American defamation law remains: what, if any, constitutional
protection exists when a private plaintiff sues over "non-pub-
lic" defamation.
The Hepps decision, while adding little more to what is
known about constitutional defamation law, actually increases
uncertainty. Footnote 4 to Justice O'Connor's majority opinion
in Hepps expressly reserved the question of "what standards
would apply if the plaintiff sues a non-media defendant."12 The
footnote forced Justices Brennan and Blackmun, who other-
wise agreed with Justice O'Connor, to file a brief concurrence
disagreeing with the footnote's suggestion that media defend-
ants should be treated differently from non-media defend-
ants. 3 Consequently, what appeared to be resolved only a year
earlier in Greenmoss has become more unraveled. We do not
know whether the distinction between media and non-media
defendants has been replaced by the distinction between public
and non-public issues, or whether both still have vitality.
After Hepps and Greenmoss, Gertz's constitutional protection
requiring a finding of "fault" for any damages and "actual mal-
ice" for recovery beyond "actual damages" clearly applies only
to a defamatory assertion involving "public issues" by "media
defendants." Indeed, the Hepps footnote cites a footnote in a
1979 Supreme Court case' 4 which noted that the requirement
that public officials and figures prove "actual malice" to re-
cover any damages may also only apply to media defendants.
What, if any, constitutional protection applies to non-media de-
fendants, whether speaking on an issue of "public" or "private
concern," and whether being sued by a public or private plain-
tiff now remains an open question. Conceivably, Hepps may be
the beginning of the Supreme Court's withdrawal from much
of defamation law; at the least it creates an opportunity to re-
write the standard. As the majority opinion observed, "When
the speech is of exclusively private concern and the plaintiff is
a private figure,... the constitutional requirements do not nec-
essarily force any change in at least some of the features of the
common-law landscape."'"
12. Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1565 n.4 (1986).
13. Id. at 1565.
14. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
15. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1565.
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The reopening of questions, apparently resolved in part only
a year prior, should not distract from the answers a majority of
the court did provide in Hepps. The plaintiffs in Hepps in-
cluded the principal stockholder of a corporation that
franchised a chain of stores, the corporation itself, and fran-
chisees. The article in the Philadelphia Inquirer linked the
plaintiffs to organized crime and attempts to improperly influ-
ence the state's governmental administration and the Liquor
Control Board in Pennsylvania. Gertz was held to be clearly
applicable because the defendant was Philadelphia Newspa-
pers, a media defendant, and the defamatory allegations were
deemed to involve issues of "public concern." (There was no
suggestion that any of the plaintiffs were public figures, invok-
ing the "actual malice" requirement for all damage recovery
under New York Times.) Hepps is the first Supreme Court
opinion to apply the public versus private issue dichotomy since
Greenmoss held Gertz only applied to defamatory statements
relating to issues of "public concern. '16 As such, it provides an
example, along with Gertz, of what kinds of issues satisfy the
Greenmoss "public issue" standard.
Furthermore, Hepps clearly holds that a private plaintiff
must prove falsity in addition to fault against a media defend-
ant accused of defamation relating to a public issue. The Hepps
majority affirms that this burden also exists for public plain-
tiffs subject to the New York Times standard. The majority
was also unpersuaded that Pennsylvania's "shield" law, which
allows media employees to refuse to divulge sources, altered
the constitutional burden although the majority reserved deci-
sion on the "permissible reach of such laws."' 7
The majority noted that "to provide 'breathing space' for true
speech on matters of public concern, the Court has been willing
to insulate even demonstrably false speech from liability and
has imposed additional requirements of fault upon the plaintiff
in a suit for defamation."' 8 The majority, therefore correctly
concluded that it had not really broken new ground by "insu-
lating speech that is not even demonstrably false."' 9 The opin-
ion also noted that as a practical matter it was very unlikely a
jury could be persuaded a defendant had inadequately investi-
16. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
17' Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1565.
18. Id. at 1565.
19. Id.
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gated the truth of a statement, when it was unproven that the
published statements were false.
Even this undramatic holding in Hepps was subject to dissent
by four Justices. Justice Stevens, writing in dissent for Chief
Justice Burger, Justice White, and Justice Rehnquist, con-
cluded that if fault can be established, "the strong and legiti-
mate [state] interest in compensating private individuals for
injury to reputation" justifies liability." By illustration, the
minority noted that even deliberate, malicious character assas-
sination would be protected so long as the actual falsity of the
published statement was unprovable. The dissenting Justices
agreed that the majority is "doubtless correct that the govern-
ment or its agents must at a minimum shoulder the burden of
proving that the speech is false and must do so with sufficient
reliability that we can be confident that true speech is not sup-
pressed."21 However, the dissent distinguished between legisla-
tion suppressing particular points of view or seditious libel and
private defamation actions. Indeed, in a footnote, the minority
would dismiss as incorrect dictum previous language imposing
on public officials the burden of proving falsity and most cer-
tainly would not impose it on private plaintiffs.22 While the mi-
nority's example of the deliberate character assassin who
publishes statements that cannot be proved false is provocative,
it ignores the principle that without an injury to a legally pro-
tected interest, there should be no recovery. Whatever the mo-
tive or culpability, under defamation law, truthful statements
do not injure legally protected interests.
After Hepps, the future of constitutional defamation law re-
mains uncertain. We still need guidance on these open
questions:
(1) Is there any constitutional protection at all for statements
of non-media defendants? If so, what is the standard?
Depending on whether the statements relate to public or
private issues, and whether they defame public or private
plaintiffs, the Court's future answers could vary.
(2) Is there any protection for media defendants addressing
non-public issues? If so, what is the standard?
(3) What is a "public" issue? Will it be interpreted broadly or
narrowly? The stakes may be very high if "private" defa-
20. Id. at 1570.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1570 n.10.
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mation warrants no or very limited constitutional
protection.
(4) Do issues that relate to prominent public figures automat-
ically relate to matters of public concern? If not, is the
Court suggesting that private issues relating to public
figures warrants no protection? This would repudiate the
all-purpose public figure concept which has previously re-
quired proof of NewYork Times malice for all matters in-
volving truly prominent figures. 23
(5) If, as Gertz suggested in dictum, opinions cannot be the
basis of a defamation claim, what is the constitutional test
for distinguishing the assertion of fact from opinion?24
(6) Is there a constitutional standard for when a publication
is false?2 5
(7) Is there a constitutional standard for what level of proof is
required to prove falsity? This question is specifically re-
served by Hepps.26
(8) Is there a constitutional limit to the "permissible reach"
of shield laws which allow media employees to refuse to
divulge sources? As noted above, this question is also
specifically reserved in Hepps.2
7
(9) Is the requirement of proving falsity relevant in an action
not seeking damages? This question was expressly left
open by Hepps.28
(10) Is there a distinct constitutional privilege to report false
statements made at public meetings or in public records?
And if so, what is the scope of the privilege?
29
(11) Is there any constitutional right to report allegations or
rumors?30
In short, twenty-two years after the Supreme Court held that
the first amendment restricts state defamation law, the scope
and dimensions of that protection and when it applies are re-
markably open questions. If Hepps, a 5-4 decision, demon-
23. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 335.
24. Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1127 (1985).
25. Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2916 (1986).
26. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1565 n.4.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279
(1971); see also Sowle, Defamation and the First Amendment: The Case for a Constitu-
tional Privilege of Fair Reporting, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 467 (1979).
30. See Edwards v. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Edwards v. New York Times Co., 434 U.S. 1002 (1977). Contra Dixson v. News-
week, Inc., 562 F.2d 626 (10th Cir. 1977).
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strates anything clearly, it is that most of constitutional
defamation law has yet to be written.

